Objective To note the frequency of discussions and disputes about tobacco control measures at the World Trade Organization (WTO) before and after the coming into force of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). To review trends or patterns in the positions taken by members of the WTO with respect to tobacco control measures. To discuss possible explanations for these observed trends/patterns.
INTRODUCTION
Trade issues have long been recognised as important for tobacco control [1] [2] [3] , and there have been a number of tobacco-related disputes within the WTO. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) was adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2003 and entered into force on 27th February 2005 [4] . The FCTC sets out obligations and provides clear guidance for its 180 States Parties on a series of (mainly demand side) tobacco control measures.
However, following a number of disagreements over the inclusion of a possible clause in the FCTC giving it precedence over World Trade Organisation (WTO) or other trade law in the event of a conflict, a compromise was reached during FCTC negotiations whereby no explicit reference was made to the relationship between tobacco control and international trade law [5] .
The first paragraph of the preamble states that the Parties to the FCTC are Òdetermined to give priority to their right to protect public healthÓ [4] . Article 2.2 of the FCTC may give it priority over treaties concluded subsequent to it, and customary international law may give the FCTC priority over treaties concluded earlier than it, but doubt remains as to the likely outcomes of disputes involving a conflict between trade and health concerns [6] . An important dispute concerning tobacco products is currently under way within the WTO, where a number of countries have complained about the adoption of plain packaging requirements by Australia [7] [8] .
In this article, we review the positions taken by members of the WTO on tobacco control measures in the post-FCTC period, not just in formal disputes but also in discussions within relevant WTO forums, notably the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee and the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Council, in order to identify trends and patterns.
METHODS
Data gathering was carried out in the following steps. We first identified formal GATT (1947 GATT ( -1995 and WTO (1995 WTO ( -2013 ÒcigarettesÓ and ÒtobaccoÓ (see Table 1 for an overview).
[ Table 1 here]
In a next step we classified and coded the positions of each WTO Member State during discussions on tobacco control and the FCTC from 1995 until 2013. We focused specifically on the two key WTO bodies where tobacco control measures are discussed. First, the TBT Committee, which looks at whether technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures introduced by a country are discriminatory and/or create (unnecessary) obstacles to trade. A typical TBT issue related to trade in tobacco products is whether regulations on plain packaging create unnecessary hurdles to trade and are more trade-restrictive than ÔnecessaryÕ to fulfil the legitimate objective of protecting the health of a countryÕs citizens. Second, the TRIPS Council, which deals with all kinds of issues related to the protection of intellectual property rights in the multilateral trading system, including trademarks, patents and copyright provisions.
A key example of a TRIPS concern in the field of tobacco control is how far the introduction of plain packaging places unjustifiable hindrances on the usage of tobacco-related trademarks. Based on this information, we coded Member States positions as follows: a) ÒopposedÓ where the minutes reflected a position in opposition to a tobacco control measure (TRIPS), or if they were identified as having a specific trade concern in the TBT database; b) ÒsupportedÓ where the minutes reflected a position in support (TRIPS and TBT); and c) ÒotherÓ if the position articulated in the minute was neither clearly supportive nor not supportive (see Table 2 
RESULTS
Our data show, first of all, that tobacco control is a much debated topic within the WTO. Of the 15 most discussed issues within the TBT Committee between 1995 and 2013 Ð as measured by the number of WTO member countries that raised concerns about the particular issue during this period Ð six issues were related to tobacco control (see Table 3 ). Moreover, tobacco control policies have also been the subject of some high profile formal WTO dispute settlement cases (see Table 1 to be suspended Òwith a view to finding a mutually agreed solutionÓ [9] .
Another interesting finding is that the importance of tobacco related issues within the WTO is a relatively recent phenomenon. The data on the issues with the greatest number of WTO members raising concerns at the TBT Committee shows that all debates on tobacco control policies took place since 2011 (see Table 3 ), while more than half of all the formal dispute settlement complaints launched in the entire GATT/WTO history involving tobacco were launched in the period since 2010 (Table 1) .
A third noteworthy observation, based on our data, is that almost all recent opposition within the WTO against the strengthening of tobacco regulations came from developing countries. This is true for the formal WTO dispute settlement cases, as well as for the debates in the TBT committee. Table 1 Malawi and in particular Zambia. Taken together, developing countries opposed tobacco control polices three times more often than developed countries, while they hardly ever spoke out in favour of strong tobacco policies (see Figure 1 ). Among developed countries, such support for strong tobacco control policies within the TBT Committee and TRIPS Council was more
common. As Figure 1 shows, high-income (HI) countries frequently supported tougher tobacco regulations, while they only occasionally raised opposition towards such measures. In fact, developed countries supported tobacco control policies twice as often as they opposed them.
[ Table 3 Nevertheless, research has shown that firms play a key role in convincing governments to file complaints at the WTOÕs Dispute Settlement Body or instigating governments to raise issues at the various WTO committees [12] [13] [14] .
In the past, most objections against tobacco control policies in the WTO or via GATT came from developed countries as a result of lobbying by TTCs. The high profile GATT case brought by the US on behalf of American tobacco companies against Thailand in 1989 is a case in point [15] (see Table 1 ). However, as shown above, over time WTO related action against tobacco control moved from high income countries towards low(er) income countries. This is particularly surprising given that developing countries generally are under-represented in the WTO disputes process, with up to 80% of all disputes initiated by high income countries [16] [17] [18] [19] .
The poorest countries in the WTO system have previously been described as Ôalmost completely disengaged from enforcement of their market access rights through formal dispute litigationÕ [20] .
How can we account for the shift to developing countries in anti-tobacco control actions in the WTO? One possibility is that TTCs have shifted their lobbying efforts from developed to developing countries. This is likely given that, as mentioned before, TTCs increasingly face ever-tougher tobacco control policies in developed countries and have even been excluded from policy-making processes in a number of high-income countries. Whilst they retain influence in the latter and continue to lobby there, their legitimacy has been damaged by a growing awareness of past deception [21] and of the health risks of smoking, leading in some cases to a loss of ÔinsiderÕ status and restrictions on their access to policy-makers [22] . Furthermore, the promotion of tobacco interests via trade agreements has become increasingly contentious in high-income countries. As early as 1992, in reaction to the aggressive pursuance of tobacco interests in East Asia, the contradiction between increasingly strong domestic tobacco control measures and the promotion of tobacco exports abroad was considered by the US General Accounting Office [23, 24] . In 1997, the Doggett Amendment was passed by the US congress, barring personnel from the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State from promoting tobacco abroad, a provision extended to all US executive branch agencies by President Clinton in 2001 [24] . Whilst in practice the US has continued to act to liberalise tobacco markets [25] , there has been renewed pressure to exclude tobacco from current trade negotiations such as that for the Trans-Pacific
Partnership agreement [26, 27] .
Whilst TTCs can and do continue to press their interests in high-income countries, in this context it is a rational strategy for them to turn to lower-income countries to represent their interests via an organisation like the WTO, where any member state can initiate a dispute or raise a concern. This is in line with other research on firm lobbying in the context of WTO dispute settlement. Typically, firms instigate their domestic government to file an official WTO complaint, or to take a stance within a committee, against a foreign country. However, increasingly firms also push foreign governments to stand up against their home country (or . What is more, none of the countries that launched a WTO dispute settlement case against AustraliaÕs plain packaging rules (see Table 1) is actually exporting any substantial amount of tobacco products to Australia. In fact, export figures for most of these countries are close to zero. Only Indonesia exports some tobacco products to Australia, but still less than 1% of its total tobacco exports [30] .
This lack of a clear pattern of economic interests among countries opposing tobacco control policies at the WTO lends support to the proposition that TTCs are exerting influence. openly oppose such policies [34, 35] . However, it is important to mention in this regard that, within the WTO context, the European Commission represents the EU and individual EU member states do not express their own opinion. This means that the EUÕs position is usually a compromise between those member states in favour and those against stricter tobacco control policies. In other words, despite the fact that the EU as a whole may not be actively supporting -or at times may even oppose -tobacco control policies within the WTO, individual EU countries may nevertheless be supportive of tobacco control initiatives.
Second, just as we do not suggest that all developed countries are in favour of tougher tobacco control polices, we also do not argue that all developing countries are against them.
Some low(er) income countries in fact openly and consistently support tobacco control policies during debates within WTO committees. Most active in this regard are Brazil and Uruguay, which is in line with their broader policies to restrict tobacco use. Brazil has Òfor the past two decadesÉbeen at the forefront of global tobacco control initiativesÓ [36] , while UruguayÕs tobacco control strategy was labelled Òworld leadingÓ by a recent report from the International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation Project [37] .
Third, we should mention three caveats to our findings. For one thing, our analysis is based on a limited number of cases during a rather short period of time. To be sure, we looked at discussions in the TBT Committee and TRIPS Council from 1995 until 2013 and GATT/WTO Disputes for the entire 1947-2103 period, yet tobacco related issues only became a frequently debated issue in the last few years, which in turn means that our conclusion that there is Òa shiftÓ from high income to low(er) income countries should be treated with some caution. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain the extent of political influence of TTCs over low(er)-income countries using methods previously proven to be effective, such as analysis of internal company documents, since we lack access to such documents for the post-FCTC period. Finally, in our analysis we have treated all tobacco related issues and disputes as equally important in the sense that we simply coded all issues/disputes raised within the WTO as either ÔbeingÕ or Ônot beingÕ about tobacco control. We acknowledge that this has limitations to the extent that such an approach does not allow us to distinguish between those issues and disputes that are very relevant to tobacco control and those that are perhaps only partially relevant.
CONCLUSIONS
Our data demonstrate an increase in disputes and discussions at the WTO related to tobacco control in the post-FCTC period and a clear shift towards lower-income countries opposing tobacco control policies. The lack of a clear pattern of economic interests among the complaining parties in the important dispute with Australia, and the legal and financial assistance provided by TTCs to those parties, suggests that TTCs are exerting influence over trade policy.
Whilst previous research using tobacco industry documents has revealed past TTC influence in some of the countries currently in dispute with Australia, including Honduras [38] , Ukraine [39] and Indonesia [40] , more research is needed to understand current forms of industry influence over trade policy.
WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS
¥ The number of WTO disputes involving tobacco control policies has increased in the post-FCTC period.
¥ Nearly all countries opposing tobacco control policies in the WTO in the post-FCTC period are low or middle income countries.
¥ TTCs have an incentive to influence the governments of low and middle income countries to oppose tobacco control via the WTO. Ireland -Proposal to introduce standardised/plain packaging of tobacco products in Ireland 9 * The indicated date is when the issue was last raised. 
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